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For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim
participation constraints, we show that e¢ cient outcomes can be approx-
imated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many
agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if
agents￿payo⁄s cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs, i.e.,
even if the so-called BDP property (￿Beliefs Determine Preferences￿ ) of
Neeman (2004) does not hold. The contrary result of Neeman (2004) rests
on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion
that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents
who have information about them.
JEL Classi￿cation: D40, D44, D80, D82
Keywords: surplus extraction, mechanism design, BDP, informational
smallness, correlated information.1 Introduction
A central theme of the economics of information concerns the ability of
agents to earn rents because they have private information that cannot be
exploited unless they are given an information rent. Thus, a seller can-
not appropriate the entire surplus from a sale if the potential buyers have
independent private values.
However, CrØmer and McLean (1988) have shown that, in models with
correlated private values, information rents can be made to disappear so
that, if there are two or more potential buyers, the seller can extract all
surplus. CrØmer and McLean (1988) assumed ￿nite type sets, but McAfee
and Reny (1992) have extended their result to models with a continuum of
types.
The analysis of CrØmer and McLean (1988) has been challenged by Nee-
man (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006). They show that the conclusions
of CrØmer and McLean (1988) depend on a peculiar property of their spec-
i￿cation of information. Under this property, which they summarize by the
phrase "beliefs determine preferences" (BDP), any agent￿ s payo⁄ can be
precisely inferred from his beliefs about the rest of the world. Thus, if there
are two states of the world in which an agent has di⁄erent payo⁄s, then, in
these two states, he must also have di⁄erent beliefs about the rest of the
world. Heifetz and Neeman (2006) show that, without this property, full
surplus extraction is impossible. They also suggest that failures of BDP are
generic.
Neeman (2004) goes one step further and argues that, with certain fail-
ures of BDP, it may not even be possible to extract any signi￿cant surplus
at all. Thus, for a model of voluntary public-good provision with interim
participation constraints, he shows that, for certain failures of BDP, feasible
and incentive-compatible public-good provision levels are close to zero when
there are many agents. His version of public-good provision with corre-
lated private values thus behaves like the independent-private-values model
of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).
We want to take issue with this claim. In a world with correlated types,
some information about a given agent￿ s payo⁄ can be obtained from the
1messages that are sent by other agents. This information may be used
to discipline the agent and to limit his information rent. In particular,
therefore, an agent￿ s ability to extract information rents is small if the agent
is informationally small, i.e. if the agent￿ s information does not add much
to the information that can be obtained from other agents. This is likely to
be the case when there are many agents and the aggregate information of
all agents but one provides a fairly precise estimate of the remaining agent￿ s
information. Neeman (2004) neglects the possibility that such additional
information may reduce the individual agents￿ability to extract information
rents.
To substantiate our criticism, we study a version of the public-good pro-
vision problem in which all agents have information about all other agents,
and we show that the information e⁄ects of having more participants out-
weigh the free-rider e⁄ects that drive the results of Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) or Neeman (2004). If the number of participants is su¢ ciently large,
it is possible to implement an approximately e¢ cient, individually rational
allocation with a positive level of public-good provision.
Our criticism should not be read as saying that Neeman￿ s theorem is
invalid. His theorem is valid, but his speci￿cation of failures of BDP involves
an implicit additional assumption that we ￿nd problematic. In Neeman￿ s
analysis, BDP fails in such a way that, for each agent and each state of the
world in which the agent gets a positive payo⁄ from the public good, there
is another state of the world in which the agent has the same beliefs, but
the payo⁄ he draws from the public good is zero. Indeed, he assumes that
the conditional probability of the zero-payo⁄ state given the agent￿ s beliefs
is bounded away from zero, regardless of what the agent￿ s beliefs might be
and regardless of how many other agents there are in the economy.
The assumption that failures of BDP are independent of the number
of participants is problematic. This requirement excludes models in which
each agent has a vector of noisy signals about the other agents so that,
if the number of agents is large, the aggregate of all agents￿noisy signals
provides very precise information about any one agent￿ s payo⁄ parameters.
In such models, the agent￿ s beliefs about the average of the other agents￿
noisy signals about his own payo⁄ parameter re￿ ect the value of the payo⁄
2parameter itself. If the agent also has information about the noise in the
other agents￿signals, BDP may still fail because a given set of beliefs may be
compatible with multiple combinations of payo⁄s parameters and additional
information. However, the extent of the failure depends on how many other
agents there are: If there are many of them and the noise in their signals is
independent, the association of the agent￿ s beliefs about the average of the
other agents￿noisy signals about his own payo⁄ parameter with the value
of the payo⁄ parameter itself will be very close, and the conditional proba-
bilities of his payo⁄ parameter given his beliefs will be close to degenerate.
Failures of BDP are less and less important when the number of participants
becomes large.
Our analysis is inspired by the literature on informational smallness.1
Heuristically, an agent is informationally small if, even without the agent￿ s
private information, it is possible to implement at least approximately e¢ -
cient outcomes. In the literature, this concept of informational smallness is
related to the role played by the individual agent￿ s private information in
determining aggregate outcomes. Thus, in a model of public-good provision,
an agent is informationally small in this sense if his in￿ uence on the decision
to provide the public good or not is small, e.g., because his information has
not much of an e⁄ect on the aggregate valuation for the public good. In our
analysis, by contrast, informational smallness also concerns the role played
by the individual agent￿ s private information in determining the amount that
he can be made to contribute to the public good. Without informational
smallness, information rents might be such that, under the given partici-
pation constraints, it would be impossible to raise any signi￿cant funds for
public-good provision at all.
The mechanisms that we use to implement approximately e¢ cient, in-
dividually rational allocations are di⁄erent from the mechanisms used by
CrØmer and McLean (1988) or, for that matter, McLean and Postlewaite
(2002). In CrØmer and McLean (1988), di⁄erences in beliefs induce di⁄er-
ences in attitudes towards bets or, more generally, state-contingent payment
schemes. These di⁄erences in attitudes towards state-contingent payment
1Palfrey and Srivastava (1986), Gul and Postlewaite (1992), McLean and Postlewaite
(2002).
3schemes are used to alleviate incentive constraints. If di⁄erences in payo⁄pa-
rameters are aligned with di⁄erences in beliefs, it is possible to extract rents,
at least in expected-value terms, by providing agents with type-dependent
state-contingent payment schemes that are designed in such a way that any
one type￿ s expected payment re￿ ects this type￿ s willingness to pay and incen-
tive compatibility is ensured by tailoring the state-contingencies of payments
to the di⁄erent beliefs of the di⁄erent types.2
By contrast, we rely on scoring rules that directly penalize agents if their
reports about their own payo⁄s di⁄er too widely from the average reports of
other agents about their payo⁄s. As discussed by Miller, Pratt, Zeckhauser,
and Johnson (2007) such scoring rules induce agents to be approximately
honest in reporting their payo⁄s if the weights given to the scoring com-
ponents in payment rules are large. In principle, such large weights given
to scoring components in payment rules are ine¢ cient because they induce
agents to su⁄er penalties if the other agents￿information about them is
noisy. However, when there are many other agents and the noise terms in
their signals are conditionally independent, the law of large numbers im-
plies that an average of these signals involves little noise. In this case, the
e¢ ciency loss from having a large weight given to scoring components in
payment rules will be negligible.
Our analysis should not be interpreted as saying that informational
smallness is of practical importance in dealing with problems of private in-
formation. Our sole objective is to clarify the relation between the di⁄erent
concepts, informational smallness and failures of BDP, and their implica-
tions for the ability of agents to obtain information rents.
In the following, Section 2 lays out the basic framework of our analysis,
the underlying economic model, as well as the speci￿cation of information
and beliefs. Section 3 provides our main result, showing that ￿rst-best
implementation can be approximated if the economy is large and each agent
is informationally small. In the concluding remarks in Section 4, we consider
2The BDP property is needed for such a scheme to eliminate all information rents: If
there are two states of the world in an agent has di⁄erent payo⁄s and the same beliefs about
the rest of the world, there is no way to prevent the agent from earning an information
rent corresponding to the di⁄erence between his payo⁄s in these two states of the world.
4the relation between our result and the literature on informational smallness.
In this section, we also return to the question of what precisely is the relation
between informational smallness and BDP.
2 The Basic Framework
2.1 The Underlying Economic Model
We consider a model with one private good and one public good: The public
good comes as a single indivisible unit. Installing it involves a per capita
cost equal to K > 0 units of the private good. There are n agents i = 1;::;n:
Agent i has a quasi-linear utility function
Ui(Q;￿i;mi) = ￿i Q + mi; (1)
where Q 2 f0;1g is the level of public-good provision, mi is the amount of
private-good consumption, and ￿i is a payo⁄ parameter. Feasibility consid-




mi ￿ nY; (2)
where nY is an exogenously given measure of aggregate resource availability.
If the allocation (Q;m1;:::mI) is to be ex post Pareto e¢ cient, one must
therefore have
Q = 1 if
n X
i=1
￿i > nK; (3)
and
Q = 0 if
n X
i=1
￿i < nK; (4)
To implement an allocation that is ex post e¢ cient, one needs to know
Pn
i=1 ￿i: However, for each i, the preference parameter ￿i is private infor-
mation of agent i: The question is to what extent this information can be
extracted and used to determine public-good provision.
52.2 Information and Beliefs
To model information, we assume that there is some underlying space ￿ of
possible states of the world, and that all beliefs are derived from a common
prior F on this space. The payo⁄ parameter ￿i of agent i is the realization
of a random variable ~ ￿i on ￿: The agent also observes two sets of signals,
￿rst-order signals si
j;j 6= i; and second-order signals ￿i
j;j 6= i; with the in-
terpretation that the ￿rst-order signals contain information about the other
agents￿payo⁄ parameters, and the second-order signals contain information
about the other agents￿￿rst-order signals about his own payo⁄ parameter.
The si
j, ￿i
j are the realizations of random variables ~ si
j, ~ ￿i
j such that, for
j 6= i;
~ si




j = ~ s
j
i + ~ ￿i
j: (6)
We assume that the random variables ~ ￿1;:::;~ ￿n take values in a compact
subset ￿ ￿ R: They are independent and identically distributed, and the
mean E~ ￿i exceeds the per-capita public-good provision cost K. We also
assume that the random variables ~ si
j; i = 1;:::;n;j 6= i; take values in a
compact set S ￿ R: Conditional on ~ ￿1;:::;~ ￿n; the random variables ~ "i
j and
~ ￿i
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of payo⁄parameters and signal observations. Given the information that the









the agent updates his expectations, replacing the prior F by a regular con-
ditional distribution on ￿ given this information. Denote this conditional

























; j 6= i,
are independent.
6distribution as Bi(ti): The agent￿ s conditional beliefs about the other agents
are then given by the joint distribution of the random variables ~ tj;j 6= i;
that is induced by the distribution Bi(ti): We denote this conditional joint
distribution of the random variables ~ tj;j 6= i; as bi(ti):
2.3 The BDP Property
As mentioned in the introduction, the analysis of CrØmer and McLean (1988)
rests on the observation that people￿ s willingness to accept bets depends on
their beliefs. Such bets can be used to extract the belief bi(ti) of agent i:
If this information can be used to infer the agent￿ s payo⁄ type ￿i; there is
no need to provide agent i with a rent for divulging ￿i: Neeman (2004) has
referred to this feature of the CrØmer and McLean (1988) model as the BDP
property ("beliefs determine preferences"). In our setting, with a common
prior on the underlying probability space, the BDP property is a property
of the prior F and the random variables ~ t1;:::~ tn: We say that F and ~ t1;:::~ tn
exhibit the BDP property if, for i = 1;:::;n; one has
E[~ ￿i(￿)jbi(~ ti)] = ~ ￿i; (8)
and
V ar[~ ￿i(￿)jbi(~ ti)] = E
h
(~ ￿i ￿ E[~ ￿i(￿)jbi(~ ti)])2jbi(~ ti)
i
= 0: (9)
F-almost surely, so that, the distribution of ~ ￿i(￿) conditional on the event
b(~ ti) = bi is degenerate and assigns all mass to a single value ￿i; thus,
~ ￿i(!) = ￿i for any ! such that b(~ ti(!)) = bi:
In our model, BDP does not generally hold. Speci￿cally, under our





￿ Agent i￿ s conditional beliefs about ~ ￿j are determined by ~ si
j; they have
nothing to do with ~ ￿i:
￿ Agent i￿ s conditional beliefs about ~ s
j
i are determined by ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i
j; it
is not generally possible to disentangle the in￿ uence of ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i
j and
to infer ~ ￿i from the agent￿ s beliefs about ~ s
j
i:
￿ Agent i￿ s conditional beliefs about ~ s
j
k, for k 6= i; are equal to his prior
beliefs; they have nothing to do with ~ ￿i:
7￿ Agent i￿ s conditional beliefs about ~ ￿
j
k, for any k, are equal to his prior
beliefs; in particular, they have nothing to do with ~ ￿i:
3 An Implementation Theorem
Because ~ ￿1;:::;~ ￿n are independent and identically distributed, with E~ ￿i > K;
we know that, if n is large, then, with a probability close to one, it is e¢ cient
for the public to be provided. In the following, we show that this e¢ cient
outcome can be approximately achieved if n is large. Moreover, under the
mechanism we consider, each agent￿ s interim expectation of the bene￿ts
from participating is strictly positive. These ￿ndings will stand in contrast
to the result in Neeman (2004), where, in the absence of BDP, participation
constraints preclude a positive level of public-good provision.
We consider direct mechanisms that do not induce truthtelling but only
"-truthtelling. We consider a class of such mechanisms parametrized by two
parameters ￿ > 0 and w > 0; as well as the number of participants n: Each
participant i is asked to submit a report





about his type. Given the reports ^ t1;:::;^ tn; the probability of public-good
provision is ￿xed at









^ ￿k ￿ K
!!
; (10)
where g(￿) is a twice continuously di⁄erentiable nondecreasing function sat-
isfying
g(x) = 0 if x ￿ 0 and g(x) = 1 if x ￿ 1: (11)
Payments are conditioned on whether the public good is provided or not. If
the public good is not provided, agent i pays
p0
































8where, as usual, the indices i ￿ 1 and i + 1 are to be understood modulo n;
with n + 1 := 1; and 1 ￿ 1 := n: If the public good is provided, the agent
pays
p1
i(^ t1;:::;^ tnj￿;w;n) = p0






^ ￿j ￿ K
1
A: (13)
Before we proceed with the analysis, we make a few comments to explain
the mechanism.
￿ The mechanism makes public-good provision depend only on the re-
ports ^ ￿i that agents send about their own payo⁄ parameters. From
(10) and (11), one infers that





^ ￿k ￿ K (14)
and





^ ￿k ￿ K + ￿: (15)
The public good is provided for sure if the average of the reports
^ ￿1;:::;^ ￿n exceeds K + ￿; it is for sure not provided if the average of
these reports is less than K: Upon comparing (14) and (15) with (3)
and (4), one sees that the provision rule (10) comes close to imple-
menting ￿rst-best if ￿ is close to zero and if the participants￿reports
about their payo⁄s are close to their actual payo⁄s. The function g(￿)
is introduced to ensure that the public-good provision rule and the
payment functions are twice continuously di⁄erentiable.
￿ Each payment function has a public-good component and a scoring
component. The parameter w indicates the weight of the scoring com-
ponent. Each of the two components of the payment function has a
targeted part and a budget-balancing part.
￿ The targeted part of the public-good component requires agent i to
pay ^ ￿i; his reported bene￿t from the public good, if the public good is
provided. The budget-balancing part provides the agent with a share
91
n of the surplus
Pn
j=1 ^ ￿j ￿ nK of the sum of targeted payments over
provision costs if the public good is provided. If the public good is not
provided, the public-good component of the payment function is zero.
￿ The targeted part of the scoring component of the payment function
requires agent i to pay w
2 times
￿








deviation of his report ^ ￿i about his payo⁄ parameter from the cross-
section average of the reports of agents other than i and i+1 about the
signals they have received about his payo⁄ parameter. The budget-
balancing part makes agent i the recipient of the targeted part of the
scoring component of agent i ￿ 1￿ s payment.
￿ The mechanism makes no use of the messages ^ ￿i
j that agents send
about the signals they have received about the signals that other agents
have about them. E¢ ciency could presumably be improved if this
information was also used.
Turning to the actual analysis, we ￿rst note that, for any ￿;w; and
n; regardless of what the reports ^ t1;:::;^ tn may be, the mechanism that is
determined by ￿;w; and n has a balanced budget.
Lemma 3.1 For any ￿;w; and n; the payment functions p0
i(￿j￿;w;n); p1
i(￿j￿;w;n);
i = 1;:::;n; satisfy X
i
p0




i(^ t1;:::;^ tnj￿;w;n) = nK (17)
for all ^ t1;:::;^ tn:










^ ￿j + nK = nK:
10Turning to agents￿payo⁄s, we assume that each agent has an initial
endowment Y: If a mechanism for public-good provision requires the agent
to pay the amount pi, his private-good consumption is reduced from Y to
mi = Y ￿ pi: His utility is then ￿iQ + Y ￿ pi, his net payo⁄ relative to the
situation without a mechanism for public-good provision is ￿iQ ￿ pi: Thus,
under the mechanisms that we are considering, agent i￿ s net payo⁄ function
is given by the equation
ui(^ t1;:::;^ tnjti;￿;w;n) = q(^ t1;:::;^ tnj￿;w;n)￿i ￿ pi(^ t1;:::;^ tnj￿;w;n); (18)
where
pi(^ t1;:::;^ tnj￿;w;n) = (1 ￿ q(^ t1;:::;^ tnj￿;w;n))p0
i(^ t1;:::;^ tnj￿;w;n) (19)
+q(^ t1;:::;^ tnj￿;w;n)p1
i(^ t1;:::;^ tnj￿;w;n)
























































We can think of ui(￿ jti;￿;w;n) as agent i￿ s payo⁄ function in a game
of imperfect information in which nature chooses the realizations t1;:::;tn
of the random variables ~ t1;:::;~ tn; each agent i observes his own type ti; and
then the di⁄erent agents simultaneously and independently choose their re-
ports ^ t1(ti);:::;^ tn(tn): A constellation (^ t1(￿);:::;^ tn(￿)) of reporting strategies
corresponds to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this game with parameters ￿;w;
and n if and only if, for each i; the strategy ^ ti(￿) is a best response to the
strategies ^ tj(￿) of agents other than i; this requires that
E
￿




ui(^ t1(~ t1);:::^ ti￿1(~ t￿1);^ t
0
i;^ ti+1(~ ti+1);:::;^ tn(~ tn)jti;￿;w;n)j~ ti = ti
i
(21)
11for (almost) all ti and all reports ^ t
0
i:
Proposition 3.2 below shows that, for any ￿ and n; a Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium of the game with parameters ￿;w; and n exists if w is su¢ ciently large.
Moreover, this equilibrium involves truthtelling in the reports ^ si
j(ti); ^ ￿i
j(ti);j 6=
i; that agent i sends about the signals si
j;￿i
j;j 6= i; that he has received about
other agents. If w and n are large, the equilibrium also involves approximate
truthtelling in the report ^ ￿i(ti) that the agent sends about his own payo⁄
parameter ￿i:
Truthtelling in ^ si
j(ti); ^ ￿i
j(ti);j 6= i; is trivially obtained from the observa-
tion that the payo⁄ ui(^ t1;:::;^ tnjti;￿;w) of agent i does not, in fact, depend
on the messages ^ si
j; ^ ￿i
j;j 6= i: Approximate truthtelling in ^ ￿i(ti) is obtained
from the consideration that, if w is su¢ ciently large, the report ^ ￿i(ti) is
largely determined by the desire to keep the scoring component of the pay-
ment pi(^ t1;:::;^ tnj￿;w;n) as low as possible. For this purpose, ^ ￿i(ti) is chosen






agents￿reports about the signals they have received about ￿i: If n is large,
then, by the law of large numbers, this expectation is close to ￿i: Whereas
the information that the agent has from observing the additional signals ￿i
j
j 6= i; is important when he forms his expectations about any one of the other
agents￿signals s
j
i; this additional information is unimportant, and only ￿i






when n is large.
To make these ideas precise, we need some additional notation. Recalling
that the range ￿ of the random variables ~ ￿i;i = 1;:::;n; is compact, let ￿ ￿ > 0
be such that j￿j ￿ ￿ ￿ for all ￿ 2 ￿: Similarly, let ￿ s > 0 be such that jsj ￿ ￿ s for
all s belonging to the range S of the random variables ~ si
j;i = 1;:::;n;j 6= i:
Further, we specify G1 and G2 so that the derivatives of the function g(￿)
satisfy




￿ ￿ G2 (22)
for all x 2 R: By (11),
G1 > 1: (23)
12Proposition 3.2 Suppose that
w￿2 > G2(￿ ￿ + ￿ s + 2￿ +
G1
w
) + 2G1￿: (24)
Then the game with parameters ￿;w; and n has a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
(^ t1(￿j￿;w;n);:::;^ tn(￿j￿;w;n)) with the following properties:




n) of agent i;
^ si
j(tij￿;w;n) = si
j and ^ ￿i
j(tij￿;w;n) = ￿i
j for all j 6= i:




n) of agent i;






































ij~ ti = ti
i
1
A = 0; (25)






k6=i ^ ￿k(~ tk)) ￿ K
￿
:
The proof of this proposition is somewhat involved and is given in the
appendix. Because each agent￿ s strategy is a function indicating how his
report depends on his type, we need a ￿xed-point argument in a suitable
function space. In a similar analysis, Miller, Pratt, Zeckhauser, and Johnson
(2007) give such an argument. However, in their setting, strategies can be
presumed to be continuous, and they can use Schauder￿ s ￿xed-point theorem
on a space of continuous functions. In the absence of any assumptions about
conditional expectations, we cannot presume that strategies are continuous.
Therefore, we work with bounded measurable functions and use Banach￿ s
￿xed-point theorem for contraction mappings. The argument exploits the
special structure resulting from our distinction between the payo⁄ parame-
ters and the di⁄erent kinds of signals. As indicated by the characterization
of equilibrium strategies in (25), if the weight w of the scoring component is








ij~ ti = ti
i
that agent i has concerning the cross-section
mean of the reports ~ s
j
i which is independent of the strategies ^ ￿j(￿) of the
13other agents. Thus, if w is large, strategic interdependence plays only a
minor role in determining reports about payo⁄ parameters.
The following theorem exploits this structure in order to give a char-
acterization of equilibrium strategies and equilibrium outcomes when the
number of participants is large.
Theorem 3.3 Let ￿ > 0 be such that
E~ ￿i ￿ K > ￿: (26)
Also, for any n, let
wn := lnn: (27)
Then, for any su¢ ciently large n; the game with parameters ￿;wn; and n has
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (^ t1(￿j￿;wn;n);:::;^ tn(￿j￿;wn;n)) with the properties
speci￿ed in Proposition 3.2. As n goes out of bounds,
^ ￿i(~ tij￿;wn;n) ￿ ~ ￿i ! 0; almost surely, for all i; (28)




ui(^ t1(~ t1j￿;wn;n);:::;^ tn(~ tnj￿;wn;n)jti;￿;wn;n)j~ ti
￿
! E~ ￿i ￿ K,
almost surely, for all i: (30)
Before we give the proof of this theorem, we brie￿ y discuss the intuition.
If the weight w of the scoring components of payment rules is large, then, as
discussed before, agents attune their reports about their payo⁄ parameters







ij~ ti = ti
i
about the cross-
section means of the reports ~ s
j
i: By the law of large numbers, for the given
speci￿cation of signals ~ s
j







ij~ ti = ti
i
must converge to the true ~ ￿i when n becomes large regardless of the infor-
mation contained in the signals ￿i
j; j 6= i. The speci￿cation (27) is chosen
so that the weights of the scoring components of payment rules are going
out of bounds and all other terms in (25) are becoming unimportant as n
becomes large. However, the weights of the scoring components go out of
14bounds slowly enough so that expected payments due to errors in the other
agents￿signals go to zero. This argument explains the convergence claim
in (28). Given this convergence to truthtelling, the rest of the theorem is
straightforward.
Proof. Because limn!1 wn = 1; we have




for any su¢ ciently large n: The ￿rst statement of the theorem then follows
from Proposition 3.2.
From (25) and (5), we further obtain














































































By the strong law of large numbers for strictly stationary stochastic processes






































as n becomes large: (28) follows immediately.
To prove (29), we observe that





































By (28), the ￿rst term inside the square brackets on the right-hand side of
(33) goes to zero, almost surely, as n becomes large. By the strong law of
large numbers, the second term inside the square brackets on the right-hand
side of (33) converges to E~ ￿i ￿ K; almost surely, as n becomes large. Since
E~ ￿i ￿K > ￿ and, by (11), g(1
￿y) = 1 if y ￿ ￿; it follows that the right-hand
side of (33) converges to one, almost surely, as n becomes large.
To prove (30), we note that, with truthtelling about the signals ~ s
j
k; the
interim payo⁄ expectation of agent i can be written as
E
￿

























j~ ti = ti
3
5;












































16From (35), we obtain
E
h


































j~ ti = ti
3
5; (36)






j ^ ￿j(~ tjj￿;wn;n) ￿ K
￿
:
















5 = E~ ￿i￿K;
(37)
almost surely: The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (36) thus converges












Because the strategy ^ ￿i(￿j￿;wn;n) is a best response to the other agents￿
strategies, it must also be the case that, for any ti; agent i￿ s expected payo⁄
from the report ^ ￿i(tij￿;wn;n) is at least as large as his expected payo⁄ from
the alternative report ^ ￿
0













^ ￿j(~ tjj￿;wn;n) ￿ K
1








































j~ ti = ti
3
5;







j6=i ^ ￿j(~ tjj￿;wn;n) ￿ K
￿
:
By the same argument as before, the ￿rst term on the right-hand side con-
verges to E~ ￿i￿K; almost surely, as n becomes large. As for the second term,
the conditional-independence and symmetry assumptions that we have im-
posed on ~ "
j
























ij~ ti = ti);






























































5 = 0: (41)




















5 = 0: (42)
Because the term under the expectations operator is everywhere nonnega-






















5 = 0; (43)
18almost surely. Now (30) follows from (40) and (43).
Theorem 3.3 is the main result of our paper. It shows that, if n is large,
the public good is provided with a probability close to one, as required for
e¢ ciency. Interim expected payo⁄s are approximately equal to the expected
per capita surplus. Information rents of individuals are approximately equal
to zero. Given that expected per capita surplus is strictly positive, interim
individual rationality is not an issue.
These ￿ndings run counter to the main result in Neeman (2004). The
di⁄erence is due to the fact that he imposes a uniformity condition on the
failure of BDP that is problematic when there are many agents. His unifor-
mity condition leaves no room for the possibility that, in a large economy,
with many other agents providing information about agent i; agent i may
be informationally small.
4 Discussion: Informational Smallness and BDP
To conclude the paper, we return to a general discussion of informational
smallness and the BDP property. In contrast to McLean and Postlewaite
(2002), we have not actually given a formal de￿nition of informational small-
ness. We have simply worked with a speci￿cation in which agents 2;:::;n
have noisy signals ~ s2
1;:::; ~ sn
1 about the payo⁄parameter ~ ￿1 of agent 1, so that,





1 provides a fairly precise
estimate of ~ ￿1; so that a scoring rule can provide agent 1 with an incentive
to be close to honest in what he reports about ~ ￿1 without his being exposed
to too much of a risk from the noise in the other agents￿signals.
In contrast to our approach, which focusses on the extent to which the
information available to any one agent can be recovered from the informa-
tion available to the other agents, the de￿nition of informational smallness
in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) is concerned with the conditional proba-
bility distribution of the overall state of the economy given the information
available to the di⁄erent participants: An agent is informationally small, if,
with a probability close to one, the information available to him has only a
small e⁄ect on the conditional distribution of the overall state of the econ-
19omy. In their model of a pure-exchange economy with common values, the
overall state of the economy corresponds to the vector of the common-value
parameters for the di⁄erent goods.
In our analysis of public-good provision under participation constraints,
the overall state of the economy would correspond to the vector (~ ￿1;:::;~ ￿n)
of the di⁄erent agents￿payo⁄ parameters.4 Given that agent i knows ~ ￿i;
the i-th element of this vector, and the other agents have only noisy signals
about ~ ￿i; it is not clear what the precise analogue of the McLean-Postlewaite
de￿nition of informational smallness in our setting would be. The issue is
compounded by the fact that their de￿nition makes essential use of their
assumption that the set of overall states of the economy is ￿nite; in our
analysis, the set of possible realizations of the vector (~ ￿1;:::;~ ￿n) is only re-
quired to be compact. Development of a formal de￿nition of informational
smallness that is quite generally applicable in a wide variety of models re-
mains a task of its own. The task is particularly challenging if one wants
to go beyond the common-prior abstract type space formulation considered
here and to think about the matter in a setting involving a universal type
space without a common-prior assumption.
McLean and Postlewaite (2002) actually assume that, within their ￿nite-
state model, the BDP property holds,5 and they use CrØmer-McLean-type
bets to ensure incentive compatibility. As they present their results, infor-
mational smallness ensures that these bets can be small and, therefore, that
they do not cause problems with risk aversion and/or wealth constraints.
Given their reliance on the BDP property though, their analysis, like that
of CrØmer and McLean (1988) is subject to the criticism of Neeman (2004)
or Heifetz and Neeman (2006).
By contrast, we do not assume the BDP property. Indeed, we have
introduced the signals ~ ￿i
j that agent i receives about the signals ~ s
j
i; j 6= i;
for the sole purpose of ensuring that the value of the payo⁄ parameters ~ ￿i
4If we were only concerned with the question of whether the public good is to be




However, because of participation constraints, we must consider information about each
individual￿ s ~ ￿i: Otherwise, it would not be possible to obtain the resources needed for
public-good provision.
5This is implicit in their treatment of what they call "distributional variability".
20cannot be inferred from the agent￿ s beliefs about ~ s
j
i;j 6= i: Our analysis
thus shows that informational smallness limits information rents even in
the absence of BDP. If the number of agents who have information about
each other is large, this e⁄ect of informational smallness neutralizes the free-
rider problem of public-good provision even though the free-rider problem
is particularly severe when there are many agents.
There is a sense in which informational smallness implies an approximate






i are given by a weighted average of his payo⁄ parameter
~ ￿i and the noisy signals ~ ￿i
j;j 6= i; that he has received about the signals
~ s
j
i;j 6= i: The weights depend on the noise terms in ~ s
j
i and ~ ￿i
j; but, if n is
large, the weight given to ~ ￿i will be close to one, and the sum of the weights
that are given to ~ ￿i
j;j 6= i; will be close to zero. In other words, we may






noisy signal about his payo⁄ parameter ~ ￿i, where the noise is small if n is
large. In this sense, our model exhibits an approximate BDP property when
n is large.6
Our implementation result suggests that information rents are small if
an approximate BDP property holds. We conjecture that this conclusion
holds far beyond the simple example that we have studied, i.e., that, quite
generally, the amount of surplus that can be extracted from agents with
private information varies continuously with the speci￿cation of information
even as we move from non-BDP to BDP models. If this conjecture turns
out to be correct, it will somewhat defuse the question, treated by Heifetz
and Neeman (2006), whether the BDP property and full surplus extraction
are "generic" or not.7
6The argument is closely related to the observation of Neeman (2004) that the BDP
property encompasses what may be called a collective BDP property, i.e., a situation
where the vector of beliefs of all agents "determines" the agent￿ s payo⁄ parameters. This
would be the case, e.g., if the information available to agent i is "non-exclusive" in the
sense of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), i.e., if this information can be inferred from
the information available to all other agents. In such a situation, agent i￿ s beliefs about
the best estimate of ~ ￿i that can be obtained by pooling the other agents￿information must
be equal to ~ ￿i itself. Thus, BDP must hold.
7Heifetz and Neeman (2006) suggest that failures of BDP and therefore also failures of
21A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.2
The proof of Proposition 3.2 proceeds in several steps. To simplify the no-
tation, we drop the reference to ￿;w;n as parameters of the payo⁄functions
and strategies whenever this can be done without loss of clarity.





j for all i and all j 6= i is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if and only if,








vi(￿i;^ ￿1(~ t1);:::^ ￿i￿1(~ ti￿1);^ ￿
0
i;^ ￿i+1(~ ti+1);:::;^ ￿n(~ tn))j~ ti = ti
i
(44)
for all ^ ￿
0












































Proof. The lemma follows directly from the fact that ui(^ t1;:::;^ tn) is inde-
pendent of ^ si
j and ^ ￿i
j;j 6= i; and that the term w
2
￿







in ui(^ t1;:::;^ tn) is also independent of ^ ￿i:
full surplus extraction are generic, where genericity is interpreted in a measure-theoretic
sense. Gizatulina and Hellwig (2009) argue that their analysis neglects the fact that,
if beliefs are interpreted as conditional expectations, given the available information, an
agent￿ s payo⁄parameter, as one piece of information that is available to him, should be one
of the conditioning variables. Relying on a topological concept of genericity, Gizatulina
and Hellwig (2009) show that the BDP property is generic if the set of variables about
which the agent forms expectations is su¢ ciently rich.
22Lemma A.2 For any i; any type ti of agent i; and any reporting strategies
^ ￿j(￿) of agents j 6= i; the best-response condition (44) has a solution ^ ￿i(tt):
Moreover, this solution satis￿es.









































Proof. To prove this lemma, we compute the slope of the function
^ ￿i ! E
h




From (45), we obtain
@E
h

















^ ￿j(~ tj) ￿ K
1










































k6=i ^ ￿k(~ tk)) ￿ K
￿
= 0 if 1
n(^ ￿i(ti)+
P
k6=i ^ ￿k(~ tk))￿
K > ￿: From (49) and (22), one therefore obtains
@E
h


































vi(^ ￿1(~ t1);:::;^ ￿n(~ tn)j~ t1;:::;~ tn)j ~ ti = ti
i
@^ ￿i
(^ ￿i) < 0
if


















vi(^ ￿1(~ t1);:::;^ ￿n(~ tn)j~ t1;:::;~ tn)j ~ ti = ti
i
is decreasing in ^ ￿i if
^ ￿i > z(ti) where z(ti) is given by (47).






k6=i ^ ￿k(~ tk)) ￿ K
￿
= 0 if 1
n(^ ￿i(ti)+
P
k6=i ^ ￿k(~ tk)) ￿ K < 0: From (49) and (22) and the fact that g takes values
between zero and one, one therefore obtains
@E
h
































vi(^ ￿1(~ t1);:::;^ ￿n(~ tn)j~ t1;:::;~ tn)j ~ ti = ti
i
@^ ￿i
(^ ￿i) > 0
24if
















Since G1 > 1; by (23), it follows, in particular, that E
h
vi(^ ￿1(~ t1);:::;^ ￿n(~ tn)j~ t1;:::;~ tn)j ~ ti = ti
i
is increasing in ^ ￿i if ^ ￿i < y(ti); where y(ti) is given by (46).
Because the function
^ ￿i ! E
h
vi(^ ￿1(~ t1);:::; ^ ￿i￿1(~ t￿1);^ ￿i;^ ￿i+1(~ ti+1); :::;^ ￿n(~ tn)j ~ t1;:::;~ tn)j~ ti = ti
i
is continuous, it has a maximum on the compact interval [y(ti);z(ti)]: Be-
cause this function is increasing below y(ti) and decreasing above z(ti); this
maximum is actually a global maximum of the function (48). The proof of
Lemma A.2 is thereby complete.
Remark A.3 For ^ ￿i belonging to the interval [y(ti);z(ti)] given by (46),
(47),
￿ ￿
￿￿i ￿ ^ ￿i
￿ ￿




where, again, ￿ ￿ and ￿ s are such that j￿j ￿ ￿ ￿ for all ￿ 2 ￿ and jsj ￿ ￿ s for all
s 2 S:






ij ~ ti = ti
i
￿ G1
w ￿ ￿￿ s￿ G1
w ; hence
￿ ￿
￿￿i ￿ ^ ￿i
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ s+ G1
w : If
￿i < ^ ￿i and ^ ￿i belongs to (50), a similar computation yields
￿
￿ ￿￿i ￿ ^ ￿i
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ s+
G1
w :
Lemma A.4 If condition (24) holds, then, for any i; any type ti of agent i;
and any reporting strategies ^ ￿j(￿) of agents j 6= i; the best response ^ ￿i(tt) of
agent i to the strategies ^ ￿j(￿);j 6= i; is unique.
25Proof. To prove this assertion, we compute the second derivative
@2E
h


















^ ￿j(~ tj) ￿ K
1







g0j ~ ti = ti
￿
￿ w; (51)















k6=i ^ ￿k(~ tk)) ￿ K
￿
= 0 if 1
n(^ ￿i(ti) +
P
k6=i ^ ￿k(~ tk)) ￿ K > ￿:
From (51) and (22), one therefore obtains
@2E
h









￿ ￿￿i ￿ ^ ￿i
￿
￿ ￿+￿)￿w: (52)
By Remark A.3, it follows that
@2E
h











If condition (24) holds, the right-hand side of (53) is negative. In this case,
the function E
h
vi(^ ￿1(~ t1);:::;:^ ￿i￿1(~ t￿1);￿; ^ ￿i+1(~ ti+1);:::;^ ￿n(~ tn)j~ t1;:::;~ tn)j~ ti = ti
i
is strictly concave and has a unique maximum on the interval (50). By the
argument given in the proof of Lemma A.2 this is also the unique global
maximum.
Lemma A.5 If condition (24) holds, then, for any i; any type ti of agent i;
and any reporting strategies ^ ￿j(￿) of agents j 6= i; ^ ￿i(ti) is a best response of
agent i to the strategies ^ ￿j(￿); j 6= i; if and only if condition (25) is satis￿ed.
Proof. By (49), (25) is just the ￿rst-order condition for ^ ￿i(ti): Lemma A.4
implies that, if condition (24) holds, the ￿rst-order condition is su¢ cient as
well as necessary for ^ ￿i(ti) to be a best response of agent i to the strategies
^ ￿j(￿); j 6= i:
26Lemma A.6 If condition (24) holds, there exists a unique vector of functions
^ ￿k(￿); k = 1;:::;n such that condition (25) holds for all i and all types ti of
agent i:
Proof. To prove this assertion, we use a contraction mapping argument.






























^ ￿k(~ tk) ￿ K
1










gj~ ti = ti
￿
:
Equations (54) for i = 1;::;n can be treated as a system of functional equa-
tions for ^ ￿i(￿); i = 1;:::;n: A solution ^ ￿i(￿); i = 1;:::;n to this system of func-
tional equations must be a ￿xed point of the mapping T that maps any vector
^ ￿ = (^ ￿1(￿);:::;^ ￿n(￿)) of real-valued measurable functions on ￿￿Sn￿1￿Rn￿1
into a vector T^ ￿ = (T1^ ￿;:::;Tn^ ￿) of real-valued measurable functions on



























^ ￿k(~ tk) ￿ K
!









gj~ ti = ti
￿
;






k6=i ^ ￿k(~ tk)) ￿ K
￿
:
By Lemma A.2, for any vector ^ ￿ = (^ ￿1(￿);:::;^ ￿n(￿)) of real-valued mea-
surable functions on ￿ ￿ Sn￿1 ￿ Rn￿1 the functions (Ti^ ￿)(￿) take values
in the interval (50). We can therefore think of T as mapping vectors of
bounded real-valued measurable functions on ￿￿Sn￿1 ￿Rn￿1 into vectors
of bounded real-valued measurable functions on ￿ ￿ Sn￿1 ￿ Rn￿1: When
endowed with the metric





￿^ ￿i(ti) ￿ ￿ ￿i(ti)
￿ ￿
￿; (56)
27the space of bounded real-valued measurable functions on ￿￿Sn￿1 ￿Rn￿1
is a complete metric space (Dunford and Schwartz (1988), p.258).
We want to show that, for some ￿ < 1;
￿(T^ ￿;T￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿(^ ￿;￿ ￿)
if w satis￿es condition (24). For this purpose, we use (55) to compute














^ ￿k(~ tk) ￿ K
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￿ ￿k(~ tk) ￿ K
!














￿ gj~ ti = ti
￿￿
; (57)






k ^ ￿k(~ tk)) ￿ K
￿
;
as before, and the symbols ￿ g0 and ￿ g in the second and third terms refer to





k ￿ ￿k(~ tk)) ￿ K
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j~ ti = ti
#
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￿(^ ￿;￿ ￿): (58)









￿i ￿ ^ ￿i(~ ti)
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￿i ￿ ￿ ￿i(~ ti)
￿















^ ￿k(~ tk) ￿ K
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￿ ￿k(~ tk) ￿ K
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￿i ￿ ^ ￿i(~ ti)
￿











￿i ￿ ￿ ￿i(~ ti)
￿













￿i ￿ ^ ￿i(~ ti)
￿









￿ ￿￿ ￿i(~ ti) ￿ ^ ￿i(~ ti)
￿
￿ ￿:
By Lemma A.2 and Remark A.3, we may suppose that
￿ ￿
￿￿i ￿ ^ ￿i(ti)
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ s+
G1
w . By the mean-value theorem and (22), we also have g0￿￿ g0 ￿ G2
n￿ n￿(^ ￿;￿ ￿):











￿i ￿ ^ ￿i(~ ti)
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￿i ￿ ￿ ￿i(~ ti)
￿
















￿(^ ￿;￿ ￿): (60)




k ^ ￿k(~ tk)￿K nor 1
n
P
k ￿ ￿k(~ tk)￿K lies in the interval (0;￿); then, by (11),
this di⁄erence is just zero. Suppose, therefore, that 1
n
P














^ ￿k(~ tk) ￿ K
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￿ ￿k(~ tk) ￿ K
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^ ￿k(~ tk) ￿ K
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￿(^ ￿;￿ ￿) (62)
From (57) - (62), we now ￿nd that, for any ^ ￿ and ￿ ￿ and any i and ti;
￿ ￿





















































￿(^ ￿;￿ ￿) (63)
29If (24) holds, the factor 1
w
h





in (63) is strictly
less than one, which proves that, in this case, T is indeed a contraction
mapping.
By Banach￿ s ￿xed-point theorem (see, e.g., Kolmogorov and Fomin (1970),
p.67), it follows that T has a unique ￿xed point ^ ￿ = (^ ￿1(￿);:::;^ ￿n(￿)): This
￿xed point provides the unique solution to the system of functional equa-
tions (54) or, equivalently, (25). By Lemma A.5, for each i; the function
^ ￿i(￿) gives the best-response strategy of agent i to the strategies ^ ￿j(￿);j 6= i;
of agents other than i: This completes the proof of the proposition.
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